

# **V&V of ISHM for Space Exploration**

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

ISHEM Forum 2005

# Two Purposes of this Talk

Our chapter in...



Connect two  
complementary  
communities of  
experts



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ISHM

V&V<sup>2</sup>

What will inhibit use of ISHEM in  
Human Space Exploration?

IT CAN'T MEET THE NASA  
HUMAN RATING  
REQUIREMENT...

IT CAN'T BE CERTIFIED!

# How NASA views ISHM

## Class A Human Rated Software Systems

*“Applies to all space flight software subsystems (ground and flight) developed and/or operated by or for NASA to*

*...*

*Examples of Class A software for human rated space flight include ... failure detection, isolation and recovery*

*...”*  
*...*

*ISHM system is Class A software*

**Mandates an approach to V&V and certification that has close parallels with those followed in other safety-critical application areas**

# E.g., FAA Software Verification

The DO-178B/ED-12B Software Verification Process defines specific verification objectives that must be satisfied; these include:

- a. **Verification of software development processes**
- b. **Review of software development life cycle data**
- c. **Functional Verification of software**
  - i. Requirements-based testing and analysis
  - ii. Robustness testing

**Scrutinize**  
**Good process** requirements, designs, ...  
reviews, inspections, ... **code**

# Two problems with this:

**Infeasible** – colossally expensive to do!

**Insufficient** – even if could, it wouldn't be enough

# ...Lessons Learned...

[Binkley, Cheng, Smith & Tosney]

“Test as you fly – fly as you test”

But... tests can be expensive...





# Another Hot-Fire Test of SSME at SSC



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And *another*, and *another*...

- **Thirty** hot-fire tests of AHMS for SSME
- These are mainly for showing that there are no *false positives*
- Many additional tests in the hardware-in-the-loop testbed to show small number of *false negatives*.

# Traditional software...

## Fault Detection, Isolation & Recovery

## ...ISHM

**Traditional** { Modest number of nominal behaviors,  
with small variants / parameter ranges

**FDIR** { Modest number of off-nominal behaviors  
Avert catastrophe-e.g., revert to safe  
mode (Paula Morgan – Cassini)

e.g., “Limit-sensing software ... straightforward  
... easy to certify” [McCann & Spirkovska]

**ISHM** { **Huge number of off-nominal behaviors**  
Avert catastrophe & **maintain capability**  
(**huge number of reactions**)

# A design requirement

*Space systems shall be designed so that no two failures result in crew or passenger fatality or permanent disability.*

# A testing requirement

*The Program Manager shall perform testing to verify and validate the performance, security, and reliability of all critical software across the entire performance envelope (or flight envelope) including mission functions, modes, and transitions*

B. Hughitt: *100% verification of critical product attributes*

Uh-oh: if 200 possible failures,  
40,000 *pairs* of possible failures

Don't Rely on Waivers!

**WAIVER**

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
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
# Traditional software architectures



# Novel ISHM software architectures


rule-based expert systems  
case-based reasoning systems  
model-based reasoning systems  
learning systems  
probabilistic reasoning systems

[Patterson-Hine,  
Aaseng,  
Biswas &  
Narasimhan]



# Emerging V&V techniques, suited to ISHM, may save the day!

**General-purpose reasoner**



**System-specific rules/models**

**Yield an answer *and its rationale***

**V&V once, then *reuse!***

**Rules/models *themselves* mathematically analyzable**

**Examples: see our paper**

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# Diagnosability

- One important property of vehicle models for ISHM: they should support *diagnosability* of a class of faults.
  - Detect all the target faults
  - Distinguish between different target faults
- Work by Charles Pecheur (formerly of NASA Ames) et al.
  - Uses “model checking” to explore all possible states of the model



# Other applications of model checking

- Verification of planning systems
- V&V of programs
  - For example, SPIN for C code, Java Pathfinder for object-oriented code, etc
  - “Out of the box” capability for detecting concurrency pathologies – embedded/reactive systems
  - Can be applied to V&V of other properties of code as well.
  - Test case generation

# Verification of Core Algorithms

- For example, voting schemes for fault detection
- V&V technologies include formal methods such as theorem proving (Rushby, SRI; Miner, LaRC)

# Verification of procedural code

- Static analysis
  - Often oriented toward “structural” defects
  - More advanced tools can target application-specific program properties
  - See Guillaume Brat’s poster
- Runtime analysis
  - Identify concurrency pathologies by analyzing test data even when the test doesn’t trigger a bug
- Program model checking
  - [Mentioned earlier]

What can YOU do?  
Please, please, please...  
design with V&V in mind!

- System and software requirements –  
formulate to be feasible for V&V
- Design –  
Irem Tumer, Andy Hess: “...HM in system trades...” include V&V in these trades  
Serdar Uckun: “...cost & benefit of ISHM...”  
include its V&V in these evaluations  
Architect to permit modification, change, ...

# Plan to advance and introduce ISHM incrementally in concert with advancement of V&V

- Ryan Mackey: incrementally introduce ISHM as confidence is gained
- Continue to do things right: none of the V&V technologies we mentioned will overcome poor development practices earlier in the lifecycle
- **Better connect the V&V community with the ISHM community starting now!**